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Abstract 
In recent years, the use of experimental methodologies has emerged as a central means of 
evaluating international aid interventions. Today, proponents of randomized control trials 
(so-called randomistas) are among the most influential of development experts. This article 
examines the growth of this thought collective, analysing how uncertainty has become a 
central concern of development institutions. It demonstrates that transformations within the 
aid industry – including the influence of evidence-based policy, the economization of 
development, and the retreat from macro-planning – created the conditions of possibility 
for experimentation. Within this field, the randomistas adeptly pursued a variety of 
rhetorical, affective, methodological, and organizational strategies that emphasized the lack 
of credible knowledge within aid and the ability of experiments to rectify the situation. 
Importantly, they have insisted on the moral worth of experimentation; indeed, the 
experimental ethic has been proposed as the way to change the spirit of development. 
Through causal certitude, they propose to reduce human suffering. The rise of 
experimentation has not, however, eliminated accusations of uncertainty; rather, it has 
redistributed the means through which knowledge about development is considered 
credible.  
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Introduction 
 
In 2011, Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo published Poor economics to widespread praise. The 
MIT economists are pioneers in the use of randomized control trials (RCTs) within international 
development. Their book, which promised ‘a radical rethinking of the way to fight global 
poverty’, is premised on the use of experimentation to assess the effectiveness of international 
aid programs. They use RCTs to measure interventions on populations randomly assigned to 
facilitate comparison across groups. For example, in a population of 500 poor, young men, half 
might receive financial literacy training while the other half do not, with researchers tracing 
differences in years to come. In the past fifteen years, the use of experimentation by social 
scientists studying poverty and development in the global South has boomed. Today it is a 
crucial epistemic practice that has been adopted throughout the academy and by NGOs, the 
World Bank, and governments. The proponents of the method - whom some have called the 
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randomistas (e.g., Ravallion, 2009a) - are today among the most influential experts within the 
aid world.  
The history and politics of experimentation within medical science have been well-
documented (Marks, 1997; Epstein, 2009; Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Lakoff, 2006). Yet, 
scholars have paid little attention to this methodology as a mode of knowing within international 
development nor as a political rationality in the global South, a phenomenon Petryna (2009) calls 
‘experimentality’ (but see Rottenburg, 2009b; Berndt, 2015). Neither those voices critical of the 
shift (of which there are some), nor the literature produced by proponents (of which there is 
much), chart the rise of the randomistas as a sociological and political phenomenon (cf. Teele, 
2014). This paper analyzes the growth of experimentation as a shift in the politics of knowledge 
within the aid industry. Randomistas problematized settled practices and knowledge, turning 
‘matters of fact’ into “matters of concern” (Latour, 2004) through their insistence on the 
pervasive lack of knowledge within international development circles.1 They offered 
experimentation as the authoritative and feasible means of achieving certainty and, eventually, 
the reduction of global poverty. In doing so, they translated epistemological and ethical values 
into practice. Proponents have depicted RCTs as the key to conclusive knowledge about ‘what 
works’ in development through their engagements with multiple publics, including academics, 
aid workers, policymakers, and what Monika Krause (2014) calls the ‘donating public’. Yet in 
the wake of their success, an ongoing search for epistemic closure has, in turn, problematized 
RCTs, leading randomistas to search for ways to repair their favored method. The result is not 
the achievement of certainty but rather an extended ‘experimental system’ (Rheinberger, 2010) 
in which the randomistas became among the most authoritative voices in international aid.   
Facticity has solidified as a field of political power in the contemporary world, and this 
article seeks to clarify how such a transformation occurred within international aid. To trace this 
shift, I follow the repertoires through which individuals have justified their approach and 
criticized alternatives. This orientation analyzes the situated moral and epistemological reasoning 
of actors, their narratives, ethos, and methods. To do so, I have surveyed academic literature, 
popular and social media, training handbooks, instructional videos, policy briefs, and 
promotional discourse. This recent history is further evidence that accusations of uncertainty can, 
in the right context, serve as potent means of reshuffling the frameworks and methodologies 
through which policy decisions are made and resources distributed. Yet, it equally gives pause to 
optimism about the ability of new metholodigies to consolidate consensus over aid policy and 
practice.  
I argue that these evaluative styles and strategies have been furthered by, first, 
transformations in the international aid landscape and, second, the consolidation of a network of 
allied organizations, techniques, and discources. This paper first introduces this thought 
collective before turning to the conditions of possibility for the rise of the randomistas, including 
the emphasis on accountability, the economization of aid, and the retreat from macro planning. It 
                                               
1 On the social study of ignorance, see Proctor and Schiebinger (2008), High et al., (2012), McGoey 
(2012), Gross and McGoey (2015).  
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then outlines the importance of approaching the randomistas as critical actors who have pursued 
strategies of legitimization ranging from the rhetorical and emotional to the methodological and 
organizational. The elective affinity between these conditions of possibility and legitimating 
strategies facilitated the expansion of RCTs as a means to reduce uncertainty. However, as the 
final section of the paper documents, indeterminacy has persisted within the aid world, 
occasioning ongoing debates and novel responses by the randomistas.  
  
The randomista thought collective 
 
The adoption of randomized control trials within development economics and the aid industry 
has been propelled by a version of what Fleck (1981 [1934]) called a ‘thought collective’. In his 
pioneering explanation, scientific facts emerge within a particular community’s conceptual and 
perceptual repertoires.2 The randomista thought collective is united, first and foremost, not in a 
consensus about a series of facts but rather in agreement about methodology. They share 
disciplinary matrices rather than policy prescriptions (Breslau, 1998). This epistemic 
commitment orients adherents toward a style of inquiry that utilizes RCTs as the means to 
achieve knowledge that is useful for development policymakers. In the words of Dani Rodrik 
(2008), the randomistas “tend to be suspicious of claims to ex ante knowledge about what works 
and what does not work.” In the quest to conclusively know ‘what works’, the randomistas insist 
upon the virtues of experimentation but, in contrast to some criticism, the randomistas do not 
practice methodological monocropping; instead, as I detail below, RCTs have been the 
paradigmatic method for a broader transformation in development knowledge and practice, the 
ur-method around which complementary ones are assembled.   
 The randomista thought collective is a porous network of interrelated but distributed 
organizations and discourses. Particular individuals, styles of reasoning (Hacking, 1992), and 
‘cognitive infrastructures’ (Hirschman & Berman, 2014) circulate within this transnational 
discourse community. As Mirowski (2014, p. 43) has suggested with regard to neoliberalism, the 
structure of the randomista thought collective might be conceived as something like a ‘Russian 
Doll’ -  a core group of adherents surrounded by concentric, linked layers (see also Mirowski & 
Plehwe, 2009). The origin of the thought collective and its continuing centre of authority is the 
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT. Founded in 2003 by Esther Duflo and 
Abhijit Banerjee, J-PAL facilitates and organizes RCTs, advocates for the method, and 
disseminates their findings.3 As of 2015 its affiliates conducted more than 600 RCTs, but its 
influence through legitimating and diffusing the method has been far greater. If RCTs were once 
a novelty in development, by 2015 they were a highly sought after staple of the field.  
                                               
2 For the related idea of ‘epistemic communities’ in international relations, see Haas (1992). 
3 Both economists are well regarded and influential. Duflo, for example, has won the John Bates Clark 
Medal and a MacArthur fellowship, addressed the UN General Assembly, and held the youngest chair at 
the Collège de France (in ‘Knowledge against Poverty’).  
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 A similar organization at Yale University, Innovations for Poverty Action, was 
established in 2002. These organizations work in a collaborative fashion, providing 
infrastructure, financing, and networks to facilitate RCTs, often conducted by doctoral students.  
These academic centres are in frequent partnership and exchange with other researchers, aid 
organizations, and governments. The thought collective has grown through funding, meetings, 
publishing, and implementation. Particularly important is the World Bank’s Development Impact 
Evaluation (DIME) unit, the Center for Global Development (CGD), a Washington, DC think 
tank, and the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). DIME was purposefully 
established in 2005 (and re-launched more ambitiously in 2009) to conduct and promote 
experimental evaluation of aid projects; by 2015 it had conducted at least 175 evaluations in 47 
countries.4 CGD does not implement aid interventions but has served as a vocal proponent of 
evaluation, including experimentation (see CGD, 2006). 3ie, for its part, is a grant-making 
organization founded in 2008 to promote impact evaluation and systematic reviews of evidence. 
Since then, it has distributed more than US$84 million in 200 grants in over 50 countries. 
Underlying the spread of the randomista thought collective are significant amounts of money and 
support, especially from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, and the UK Department for International Development (DfID). Governments, too, 
have adopted the emphasis on evaluation, with Mexico a forerunner in the adoption of RCTs.   
 The use of RCTs provides access to certain resources, networks, and prestige. As one 
expands beyond the core sources of finance, authority, and ideas, the thought collective can 
include a dizzying array of initiatives and organizations. 3ie has more than 100 partner 
organizations and identifies 45 distinct repositories for impact evaluations (Mishra & Cameron, 
2013). IPA has more than 400 research associates. J-PAL has offices on five continents. Indeed, 
it is an indicator of the very success of the original premise that it has been adopted or responded 
to by nearly all major stakeholders in the aid industry. Duflo has described herself as an 
‘institution builder’ (Parker, 2010), and the randomistas are active proselytizers, publishing 
training materials and handbooks, creating new academic journals, offering online courses, and 
using blogs and social media to particular effect. Esther Duflo’s TED Talk has been viewed more 
than 700,000 times and their work often appears in the media. Poor economics, Banerjee and 
Duflo’s award-winning book, was reviewed positively in publications from The New York Times 
to The Cleveland Plain Dealer. The creation and circulation of this discourse cultivates the 
multiple publics with which they engage and expands the thought collective. 
Since 2009, there has been a more concerted effort to shape government policy. The idea 
for J-PAL was to “engage decision-makers not just as experimental partners but as adopters of 
programs that have already been vetted” (Parker, 2010). Yet, they found that their evidence did 
not always translate into policy action. As Michael Kremer, a pioneer of development RCTs, 
                                               
4 Other aid organizations have created initiatives to promote the use of experimentation and generalized 
the practice throughout their work. For example, USAID’s Development Innovation Ventures promotes 
them and the US Millennium Challenge Corporation does so for 40 per cent of its projects (Gilbert, 
2013). 
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noted, ‘While evidence can play a very important role for certain policy makers, it’s far from 
enough on its own’ (quoted in McMurtrie, 2014). In response, core individuals from the 
randomista thought collective have begun implementing aid interventions directly. Kremer co-
founded Deworm the World which is today an initiative of Evidence Action, an NGO initially 
housed at Yale’s IPA that seeks to expand interventions determined effective by RCTs. 
Similarly, with the support of the Hewlett Foundation, behavioural economists associated with 
the thought collective formed ideas42, an entity ‘with the goal of using scientific insights to 
design innovative policies and products’.5 
  
The changing landscape of the international aid industry 
 
The randomistas have emerged and now operate within a broader disciplinary and institutional 
regime. If the latter half of this article attends to the ‘social life of methods’ (Savage, 2013), this 
section considers what Eyal (2013) calls the “background of practices” that are the ‘condition of 
possibility’ for expertise. It asks not who is authorized to do or say what, but rather what forms 
of life or shared orientations were necessary for the rise of the randomistas to be a reasonable 
possibility, let alone occur. Three are particularly salient: the field of evidence-based policy, the 
economization of aid, and the proliferation of NGOs. 
 Before turning to these, it is important to note that experimentatal assessments of social 
policies have a longer history, particularly in the United States. In 1969, for example, the 
psychologist Donald T. Campbell published a programmatic essay entitled ‘Reforms as 
experiments’. Social scientists, he claimed, should be the ‘methodological servants of an 
experimenting society’ (Campbell, 1973), enrolled to ‘try out new programs designed to cure 
specific social problems’ (Campbell, 1969). In the coming years, dozens of social services were 
evaluated experimentally, including a study of more than 1200 households in New Jersey to 
assess the effects of a negative income tax credit and an early assessment of the Head Start 
program (see Dehue, 2001; Bartholomée, 2005). Such histories, however, have rarely been 
discussed publicly within international aid networks. Instead, as I discuss below, when 
development economists and policymakers sought to promote social experiemntation, they more 
frequently invoked a schematic history of medical experimentation, using the presumed authority 
of biomedicine as a justification for emulating it.  
 
 
Evidence-based policymaking 
As this special issue makes clear, ‘evidence-based policy’ is a discourse and practice reshaping 
the work of states and NGOs across the globe. The promise of evidence-based policy is the stage 
on which the randomistas’ arguments and activities take place. Indeed, many of the disputes in 
which randomistas engage are about how, exactly, aid practitioners can best implement 
evidence-based policies. Rarely do individuals who decry the predominance of RCTs question 
                                               
5 See: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/partners/ideas42 
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the broader goal of evaluating development projects; instead, they seek an appropriate 
methodological balance in order to investigate “what works and what does not in the fight 
against poverty” (Ravallion, 2009a, p.5; see also Ravallion 2009b; Deaton, 2010). Yet, the 
randomista thought collective is relatively autonomous from, and therefore not reducible to, the 
broader evidence-based policy movement (but see Pearce & Raman, 2014). Randomistas 
coalesce in their own institutions and publish in their own venues. Importantly, they also 
understand themselves to be semi-autonomous, often critically engaging with other proponents 
of evidence-based policy by offering a more certain style of knowing.  
 There is a long history of ‘monitoring and evaluation’ (M&E) within international aid 
organizations. Such techniques serve multiple purposes. Like other ‘technologies of trust’ (Porter 
1996), these audits serve as a means of ascertaining and governing ‘action at a distance’ (Power, 
1997; Rose, 1999). There is a heightened emphasis on accountability within international aid 
because public revenue is spent at a remove from citizens, top-level management, and other 
constituencies (Rottenburg, 2009a; Jensen & Winthereik, 2013). Audits also function as a 
measure of worth. As Krause (2014) has detailed, aid organizations operate within a competitive 
field in which ‘agencies produce projects for a quasi-market in which donors are consumers’. 
Methods such as interviews and logframes facilitate the evaluation of aid and, crucially, the 
comparison of heterogenous projects, indicating which should receive support. However, as 
Margarita Rayzberg (2014) has documented, the randomistas emerged in contrast to existing 
M&E approaches which they deemed less ‘rigorous’.  
 This was important because, around the turn of the century, there was heightened 
emphasis on improving the effectiveness of aid. For many observers, however, there simply was 
not enough evidence to know one way or the other if aid was effective. For example, the US 
Congress’s Meltzer Commission (2000) found that only 5-10 percent of World Bank projects 
were reviewed within 3-5 years. The Center for Global Development’s Evaluation Gap initiative 
documented, over a number of years, the paucity of studies of aid effectiveness. As its president, 
Nancy Birdsall (2006), said, ‘Without impact evaluations that are rigorous, independent, and thus 
credible we cannot know what programs work. We cannot even argue convincingly that foreign 
aid itself works’. By 2006, major aid organizations responded with a substantially expanded 
commitment to impact evaluation. And newer entrants like the Gates Foundation are particularly 
supportive (Gates, 2013). 
 Such dynamics are closely related to budgetary concerns, especially after 2008 when 
foreign aid budgets have been under further pressure. The randomistas frequently emphasize the 
importance of experimental evaluation of cost effectiveness. Governments, such as the United 
Kingdom, place considerable emphasis on using RCTs to achieve ‘value for money’ (Whitty & 
Dercon, 2013). Ruth Levine (2014) - who co-authored CGD’s Evaluation Gap report, advised 
USAID on evaluation policy, and subsequently directed the Hewlett Foundation’s development 
work - explains that evaluation can ‘lead to better use of money’ by aid organizations. J-PAL’s 
director Rachel Glennerster and Harvard’s Michael Kremer (2011) valorize RCTs for allowing 
funders ‘to design successful and cost-effective programs’.  
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This broader discourse enhanced the audibility of the randomistas. Their commitment to 
experimental evaluation was understood by others within the aid world as a more precise means 
of achieving their goals. RCTs displayed “generosity”, allowing others to incorporate them into 
their work (Eyal, 2013). By offering an answer that was deemed both effective and feasible, the 
randomistas became the most prominent experts within the energized field of evidence-based 
aid.  
 
 
 
The economization of development 
The rise of the randomistas was also facilitated by the existing influence of academic economics 
within key institutions in the aid industry. Organizations like the Gates Foundation, DfID, and 
especially the World Bank maintain close ties to neoclassical economics departments at 
universities and often hire or fund academic economists. Although new sources of funding have 
somewhat diminished the financial sway of the World Bank, it maintains its leading position as a 
source of intellectual authority and influence.  
The heightened role of economists within the World Bank dates to the presidency of 
George Woods (1963-1968) who established the economics department and the influential 
position of chief economist. Under his tenure, the number of economists increased by 25 per 
cent. By 1991, 80 per cent of senior staff in the Policy, Research, and External Affairs 
departments were trained in economics or finance (Woods, 2000, p. 152). Economists replaced 
engineers, medics, geologists, and agronomists, whose services are now usually contracted when 
needed (Moore, 2007).  
As Stein (2008) has demonstrated, the ties between universities and the World Bank 
accelerates the uptake of academic trends within aid policy. Within the discipline, 
methodological innovation and precise measurement are rewarded (Fourcade et al., 2015). 
Evidence is understood as quantified, causal proof rather than data observed or experienced. The 
randomistas’ emphasis on ‘what works’ for policy interventions is indicative of the discipline’s 
commitment to ‘fixing the economy’ (Mitchell, 1998). It is a style of reasoning which pays ‘little 
attention to history’ (Fourcade et al., 2015, p. 108) and seeks to both generalize and expand into 
new domains - often those traditionally associated with other disciplines (Fine & Milonakis, 
2009). 
 However, some economists have been critics of the rise of randomized control trials (e.g., 
Deaton, 2010; Ravallion, 2009b; Rodrik, 2008). The reasons for the disputes differ, but most 
have been specific, often technical, and within the bounds of broader shared commitments - not 
least for improved knowledge.6 At stake for both the randomistas and these interlocutors is how 
                                               
6 There exist at least two important exceptions. First is Basu’s (2014) call for non-quantifiable forms of 
knowing such as wisdom, reasoned intuition, and judgment. The other is Ravallion’s (2014) concern 
about the ethics of RCTs. As of 2015, both approaches sit at odds with the prevailing approaches of the 
randomistas.  
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best to reduce or eliminate ambiguities. Crucially, the randomistas and these critics with whom 
they engage operate within the bounds of mainstream, neoclassical economics. They do not 
challenge the disciplinary presuppositions.7 Orthodox economics is the taken-for-granted 
background on which the critique offered by randomistas has been deployed. It serves as an 
institution that stabilizes and fixes meaning, offering a grammar in which worth is debated. 
Where the randomistas do differ from the orthodoxy - such as the use of behavioral economics - 
they remain in good professional standing (Davis, 2013).  
 Within neoclassical economics, however, the 1990s were a time of change. What Angrist 
and Pischke (2010) call the ‘credibility revolution’ brought applied microeconomics to the fore. 
A newer, more determined approach to causality, research design, and interference was 
contrasted with more theoretical work in the 1970s and 1980s (Fourcade, et al., 2015, p. 92). In 
the realm of development economics, this was particularly a critique of macroeconomic growth 
regression analyses which previously dominated debates about the effectiveness of aid. For 
proponents of RCTs, such methods were akin to ‘speculating on a grand scale’ (Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2011, pp. 3-4). They advocated moving past the ‘big questions’ of theory testing and 
towards specific policy questions (cf. Rodrik, 2008; Bates, 2007). 
 
 
NGOification and the retreat from large-scale planning 
The randomistas have, therefore, been associated with a scalar transformation in aid practice. In 
the early years of the Bretton Woods regime, international finance institutions and bilateral donor 
agencies focused predominantly on large-scale infrastructural investments. By the late 1960s, 
however, such initiatives were the subject of considerable critique. At the World Bank, Robert 
McNamara downplayed infrastructure development in favour of poverty reduction and ‘basic 
needs’. The 1973 US Foreign Assistance Act directed bilateral aid toward food, nutrition, health, 
and education (Stein, 2008, pp. 14-15). And a considerable network of formal institutions and 
individuals pursued ‘community development’ across the global South (Immerwahr, 2015). This 
approach was significantly furthered, first, by the discrediting of state planning by the late 1980s, 
and later by the UN’s Millennium Development Goals which served as a powerful means of 
channelling funding toward smaller interventions (Picciotto, 2014). By the late 1990s, the 
project-centred approach spurred the worldwide growth of non-governmental organizations. 
 The resulting arrangement, at both major institutions and smaller NGOs, means that 
much aid is funded and administered through individual projects, not sector- or country-wide 
schemes (Krause, 2014). RCTs were particularly well-suited to the down-scaling of aid 
interventions. Randomistas do not do not generally seek to assess the effectiveness of, for 
example, aid writ large or general budget support. The method is not suited for that. Rather, they 
                                               
7 The historical consolidation of orthodox economics is both well-documented and frequently criticized 
for its positivism, methodological individualism, and mathematicization. See, for example, Mirowski 
(1991, 2002), Steinmetz (2005) and Milonakis and Fine (2008).  
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seek to assess the impact of particular programs and projects (e.g., the distribution of textbooks 
or bed nets). 
 Doing so requires closely working with implementers, sometimes even changing the 
intervention in order to make it fit the methodology (cf. MacKenzie, 2008). For the randomistas, 
working with NGOs is highly desirable. As Glennerster and Kremer (2011) write of the earliest 
aid RCTs, ‘NGOs, in contrast to governments, proved to be highly flexible and open to 
experimenting with new ideas’. Today, many NGOs seek experimental evaluation due to 
funders’ requirements, efforts to improve their work, and the desire to demonstrate effectiveness 
in a competitive field. The multiplicity of NGOs (in contrast to governments) means randomistas 
can find willing partners, even when they are interested in studies that may debunk the status 
quo.8 
The NGOification of aid has necessitated new indicators. A previous era of development 
positioned economic growth and national income as the key measures of success. However, 
since at least 1990, when the Human Development Index was created to combine indicators of 
health and education with income measures, the aid world has been host to a profusion of 
indicators. These classifications, numbers, and ranks have emerged as a key mechanism of 
government (Davis et al., 2012). RCTs, first through the evaluation of specific interventions and 
then through the amalgamation of many experiments, are a similar technique of knowing and 
governing. They enumerate not populations but specific groups of beneficiaries (cf. Foucault, 
2009). They assess not ‘need’ but ‘impact’ (Krause, 2010). 
The affordances of the experimental method - including intensive data-gathering across 
treatment and control groups - suit project-based aid work. It permits an audit deemed more 
accurate than alternatives, whether focus groups, interviews, or otherwise. And experimentation 
also displays a temporal affinity with the prevailing logics: the duration of both project funding 
and RCTs often align (a couple of years) and, furthermore, RCTs seem to offer an evaluation 
more quickly than other means (such as waiting for the next census or general household 
survey).9  
If RCTs proved particularly compatible with small-scale interventions at the start, in 
recent years this is changing. As RCTs have entered the mainstream, and techniques for 
designing and managing trials have improved, the scope is expanding. One took place 
throughout the entirety of Andhra Pradesh (population nearly 50 million) while another, as part 
of a move into the global North, tested job training programs in half of the cities in France (The 
                                               
8 In his profile of Duflo, Parker (2010) writes that she ‘had long wanted to use experimental methods to 
put microfinance to the test. As she saw it, there was little beyond anecdote to support claims that the 
technique had a special power to combat poverty, gender inequality, and ill health’. Only ‘after a lengthy 
search in an industry wary of subjecting itself to this kind of scrutiny’ did she find a microfinance 
institution willing to subject itself to an RCT. 
9 This is not always the case: in some cases, the experiment is considered too short or begins too late, 
leading to questions about whether it truly captured a project’s effect. Randomistas have, in turn, sought 
to influence project design at an early stage, furthering the performativity of the method. For a critique of 
the short timeframe of RCTs, see Olofsgård (2012) and Woolcock (2009).  
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Economist, 2013). Such a trajectory fits with the ambitious narrative of the randomistas which 
seeks to accumulate general knowledge through multiple experiments.10  
 
Experimentation contra indeterminacy 
It was within this broader context that the randomista thought collective grew; however, there 
was nothing preordained about its emergence, and a fulsome understanding of the politics of 
experimental knowledge requires close attention to the manner in which proponents questioned 
the status quo and established agreement about the desirability of development RCTs. To do so, 
it it useful to follow the pragmatic sociology of critical capacity developed by Luc Boltanski 
(2011) and his collaborators (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Boltanski &Thévenot 1999).11 Their 
oeuvre attends to the manner in which actors justify, generalize, and confirm, or (alternatively) 
qualify, challenge, and critique, the situations in which they operate. They analyze the ethics and 
spirits which motivate critique and animate communities. Pragmatic sociology draws a 
distinction between ‘worlds’, which are regimes of social consensus and representation, and 
‘reality’, which is always at least partially at odds with representational schemes. Critique 
operates to open up that gap, challenging and destabilizing worlds through ‘reality tests’. For 
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), disputes take place within certain schema which they call 
‘grammars of justification’. When successful, critique undermines the ‘semantic security’ that is 
indicative of stable institutions and practices; it insists that signs, words, or means of calculating 
are out of step with reality.  
Such an interpretive approach highlights the moral commitments immanent in seemingly 
technocratic discourse. Similarly, within science studies, there is a long tradition of analyzing the 
literary, visual, and discursive production of scientific achievement (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; 
Latour, 1987). McCloskey (1998) in particular has pioneered the study of economists’ 
representations, demonstrating the ways in which authority is performed and achieved through 
rhetoric. Credibility requires that economists - like other scientists (Hilgartner, 2000) - manage 
their narrative structures, frames, and evidence in ways that are compelling for particular 
audiences. 
The benefit of such an approach is to foreground the disputes that emerge due to conflicts 
over these regimes of value and justice within the aid industry. The randomistas have engaged in 
two, interlinked critiques. First, they have disputed the reality of aid’s effectiveness. As I detail 
below, they justify their approach through the ultimate desire to improve the ways in which 
public policy is able to reduce poverty, mortality, and other forms of human suffering. Closely 
related to this is their denunciation of the prevailing representations of the effectiveness of aid. 
Within the justificatory regime of development aid, credible knowledge is highly valued by 
funders, implementers, and the public at large. RCTs are presented as a methodology that 
                                               
10 For further discussion of this expansionary logic, see Blattman (2011), Ludwig et al. (2011), Banerjee 
and Duflo (2009) and Duflo and Kremer (2005). 
11 For discussions of pragmatic sociology, see Browne (2014), Bénatouïl (1999), Celikates (2006) and 
Wagner (1999). For an application to economics, see Davies (2014) and Boltanski and Chiapello (2006). 
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determines whether or not knowledge about aid is accurate. In this case, their targets for 
denunciation have been other ways of knowing. Through the skillful legitimation of experiments, 
they have enrolled adherent to their view that the existing manner of assigning worth was not a 
proper reflection of reality.  
 This is a critical, evaluative orientation that privileges empirical results obtained through 
a particular method. But the randomistas have not been merely denunciatory nor empirical; they 
have sought epistemic closure, not confoundment. They are not oriented toward critique for its 
own sake, and they do not cast suspicion on the very possibility of development nor the 
feasibility of aid writ large. They are reformists, not radical. Their critique demonstrates a 
differential between what should be and what is. It is sympathetic and constructive, which 
accounts for some of their success and some of the reactions to their success: because they are 
legible contributors, large portions of the aid industry recognize them as beneficial, but because 
their commitments do not depart from a larger status quo, they are also the subject of strident 
rebuttals by critics who see RCTs as reproducing an overly narrow economics (Reddy, 2012).  
 
Between critique and confirmation: Legitimating experimentation 
 
If transformations within the aid industry made the rise of the randomistas possible, particular 
actions and strategies made it occur. Central to their success has been the cultivation of a 
consensus that RCTs are a compelling manner in which to reduce uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of aid. However, because their overarching themes and methodological 
commitments have been valorized to multiple publics – including academics, policymakers, aid 
workers, and the donating public – the significance of uncertainty has differed. In economics 
journals this takes the form of a careful research design to achieve valid causal results. For 
policymakers, the indeterminacies of accountability and cost-benefit analysis are emphasized. 
And when addressing less expert audiences, uncertainty is to be reduced because it impedes the 
effectiveness of aid and, therefore, contributes to human suffering. Such flexibility functions to 
enroll numerous supporters. 
In each of these registers, experimentation is justified as a moral methodology. As Daston 
and Galison (2010, p. 36) argue, the nature of scientific objectivity has changed over time but is, 
fundamentally, an ethical issue because it involves the ‘suppression of some aspect of the self’. 
For the randomistas, RCTs have ‘epistemic virtue’ because they remake aid workers by 
removing subjective bias. But because they are engaged in public policy debates, the randomista 
thought collective adopts an even more urgent moral message. They exhort others to adopt the 
methodology not only to reform themselves but to transform the distribution of resources. The 
value-laden proposition of the randomistas is that more objective knowledge about causation 
(‘what works’) is a crucial factor for a host of humanistic goals (poverty alleviation, gender 
equality, and so forth). This section discusses how the randomistas have fashioned themselves 
and been understood by their audiences. To do so it examines the variety of legitimation 
strategies deployed by the thought collective.  
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For the randomista thought collective, RCTs demand a different type of aid researcher. 
‘The great virtue’, Banerje' (2007) writes, ‘is that they force us to venture inside the machine. To 
implement a proper evaluation, one has to know the exact details that define a program. And as 
economists think about them, they begin to build stories about them and get ideas about how to 
change them for the better’. RCTs reform economists from ‘sitting in your office downloading 
data and working regressions’ (Glennerster quoted in McMurtrie, 2014) to getting ‘on-the-
ground experience [that] shows us the realities that might otherwise have been left out of our 
models’ (Glennerster & Kremer, 2011). Proponents value field experiments not only for offering 
better results but because it suits their dispositions and reveals new insights. Ian Parker (2010) 
reports that Esther Duflo is ‘effusive’ about fieldwork: ‘I love it, I love everything about it. It is 
the only way, when you work on development, to get an intuitive sense of how people really live 
their lives’.12 
Intimacy, however, brings risks. Historically, guidelines within the aid industry have 
sought to minimize the interaction between implementers and evaluators to avoid any conflict of 
interest.  RCTs, in contrast require close collaboration between evaluators and implementers (in 
order to ensure random assignment, for example). For proponents, the attendant risks of 
impropriety are eliminated by the methodology.13 It disciplines evaluators by minimizing 
discretion and the possibility of error. As the director of J-PAL writes, despite the close 
collaboration, ‘it is possible for randomized evaluations to provide independent or objective 
results’. She continues, 
This is because, for the most part, the results of a randomized evaluation are what they 
are... [T]here is relatively little flexibility for the evaluator to run the analysis different 
ways to generate the outcome they want to see… [C]ompared to much other evaluation 
work carried out by development agencies, randomized evaluations provide results which 
are harder to manipulate and thus are reasonably objective... (Glennerster, 2013) 
 
In this way, the experimental method is valuable because it enforces what Porter (1996) has 
called ‘procedural objectivity’, or the application of impersonal rules to subjective practice. This 
is particularly important for two, related reasons. In public policy, where transparency is valued, 
numbers are understood to reduce arbitrary decision-making. In applied research domains, which 
are often less prestigious and vulnerable to accusations of interestedness, objectivity is even 
more a virtue (Breslau, 1998). 
 Experimentation is also justified because it establishes causal relationships, removing 
potentially confounding variables.14 In the early days, many spoke of RCTs as the ‘gold 
standard’ for economics research, but today the most common way for randomistas to 
characterize their evidence is ‘rigorous’. This is because a randomized control trial, if properly 
                                               
12 For a critique of the underappreciated role that ‘intuition’ plays in popular development economics, see 
McGovern (2011). 
13 For an excellent illustration of this, see Margarita Rayzberg’s forthcoming “Fairness in the Field.” 
14 Breslau (1998) notes that it is a particularly Humean notion of mechanistic cause-and-effect. On the 
varieties of causation, see Hirschman and Reed (2014). 
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implemented, has ‘internal validity’, meaning the inference of a causal relationship between two 
variables is warranted.15 As John List (2009), a prominent experimental economist, argues, the 
fundamental challenge in the social sciences ‘is how to go beyond correlational analysis to 
provide insights on causation’. In the view of the randomistas, RCTs are uniquely capable of 
doing so because they “represent a mixture of control and realism usually not achieved in the 
laboratory or with uncontrolled data, permitting the analyst to address questions that heretofore 
were quite difficult to answer” (Levitt & List, 2009). Moreover, RCTs are promoted as self-
evident, very nearly speaking for themselves: ‘the evidence is simple to interpret. The beauty of 
randomized evaluations is that the results are what they are’ (Banerjee et al., 2007). 
 This is particularly important for policymaking. The randomistas promise causal certitude 
in their aspiration to provide useful science. Historically, program evaluation has lacked prestige 
in aid organizations, but the randomistas have overcome this by shifting from assessments of 
past projects to guides for future interventions. Their motto is not “what worked in that instance” 
but rather ‘what works’ generally. They are ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Krugman, 1995), actively 
disseminating their findings as recommendations for funders and implementers, and often called 
upon as experts, collaborators, and consultants.  
The acquisition of this authority has benefitted from the invocation of medicine as a 
model for international development. The adoption of RCTs is an aspect of what Davies (2013) 
calls a change in economics, ‘from aspiring to the status of physics to aspiring to that of biology’ 
(cf. Joffe, 2013, 2014). In the case at hand, economists seek to learn from medicine, emulate it, 
and use it as a means of justifying their work (cf. Mirowski, 1991). As Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011, p. 8) write, ‘the cleanest way to answer such questions [of causality] is to mimic the 
randomized trials that are used in medicine to evaluate the effectiveness of new drugs’. In Karlan 
and Appel’s (2012) book promoting aid experimentation, they argue that the RCT “has long been 
the gold standard throughout the sciences for determining effectiveness. To take an example, the 
Food and Drug Administration requires data from an RCT to warrant approval for new 
medicines. In general, if you need rigorous and systematic evidence of effectiveness on a large 
scale, you use an RCT to get it.” When discussed in more popular media, medicine is also the 
reference (e.g., The Economist, 2013).  
 It would be an overstatement to suggest the randomistas naively equate biomedicine and 
social policy; rather, a more diffuse and subtle process is at play. In the above cases, medicine is 
an explanation-at-hand but, given its presentation as an authoritative science, it also serves to 
legitimate the randomistas. This happens through mundane conventions, such as referring to aid 
projects as ‘treatments’, and major advocacy reports, like the Center for Global Development’s 
Evaluation Gap report (CGD, 2006). Authored by individuals with both medical and economics 
training, this influential document repeatedly drew an equivalence between medicine and 
economics. They write,  
                                               
15 The qualification is significant. As an enormous literature on medical trials attests, properly designing 
and implementing an RCT is a considerable difficulty. These qualifications have rarely intruded on the 
rise of the randomistas.  
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No responsible physician would consider prescribing medications without properly 
evaluating their impact or potential side effects. Yet in social development programs, 
where large sums of money are spent to modify population behaviors, change economic 
livelihoods, and potentially alter cultures or family structure, no such standard has been 
adopted. 
 
Continuing later, they declare that ‘The simple truth is that many well intentioned social 
programs are like promising medical treatments - we cannot really know if they do more good 
than harm until they are tested’. Of course, the assumption that medical experimentation offers 
obvious, unmistakable evidence has long been questioned by social scientific and medical 
observers alike (e.g., Will & Moreira 2010). What is notable in this case of methodological 
change, however, is the aphasia that occurs as experimentation crosses disciplinary boundaries.16 
Justifying aid RCTs has involved overlooking other aspects of experimentation, too. For 
the adherents, the use of the experimental methodology is a “radical” innovation. This word is 
rarely defined but rather signifies as an iconoclastic break from business as usual.17 The 
randomistas self-fashion as an upstart group, fighting against the tide. J-PAL’s director recounts 
that ‘When we started, there was a huge amount of resistance and hostility in the development 
community’ (Glennerster in Parker, 2010). Despite their enormous influence, they continue to 
depict themselves as peripheral. The influential evaluation proponent William Savedoff (2014), 
for example, notes that more are being done than ever before but says that  
RCTs are marginal because only about 200 of them (my estimate based on the 3ie 
database) are being started in any given year on topics related to development programs. 
This is dwarfed by the thousands of evaluations being conducted using expert interviews, 
focus groups, non-purposive samples, and quasi-experimental methods. 
 
Thus, for key proponents, the measure of critical success is the quantitative proportion of RCT 
evaluations, not the epistemic or discursive authority of the method. 
Randomistas believe proper methods can reveal evidence unsullied by ideology, politics, 
and fads (cf. Latour, 1993). The economist Diane Coyle (2011) praises the randomistas for 
departing from a ‘landscape of development economics [that] has been scarred by ideological 
battle’. Another proponent bemoans the fact that “politics still drives most Western countries’ 
foreign development aid’ instead of ‘scientific and evidence-based tools for policymaking and 
                                               
16 On historical ‘aphasia’, see Stoler (2011). 
17 Randomistas have successfully portrayed their approach as novel despite a history of field experiments 
in economics since at least the 1920s and the use of experimental evaluation of social policies throughout 
the postwar era. More often than not, this history is effaced, but when it is not, the older generation of 
experiments is, paradoxically, deemed both too expensive and too limited. As J-PAL’s Glennerster and 
Harvard’s Kremer (2011) write, ‘Randomized trials have been used to study social and economic 
conditions in the developed world for some time. In the 1970s the US government conducted large-scale 
evaluations of a negative income tax and of health insurance. But, while these evaluations were useful, 
they tended to be expensive one-offs, designed to measure the impact of a single policy with many 
components, making it difficult to learn in a cumulative way over time’. 
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priority setting’ (Schmitt, 2014). The lack of certainty means that development economics ‘has 
promoted a great many ‘big-think’ fads’ (Glennerster & Kremer, 2011). Experimental evidence 
is portrayed as a rupture from these histories. The causal certitude revealed through RCTs makes 
for a common narrative structure: people have typically thought X, but now we know it is actually 
Y.18 To pick just one such proclamation, “Many economists believe those who most need a 
product are more likely to pay for it. They’re wrong” (Glennerster & Kremer, 2011). Thus the 
randomistas public proposition is an epistemic iconoclasm, not only strategically positing 
ignorance but claiming to have rectified the deficit. 
But, quite importantly, the rhetoric of the randomistas is not reducible to facticity and 
bravado.19 Indeed, there is often an emphasis on modesty and inquisitiveness. They speak of a 
‘quiet revolution’ that improves things ‘at the margin’ (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Their approach 
is to see ‘the fight against poverty... as a set of concrete problems that, once properly identified 
and understood, can be solved one at a time’ (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, p. 3). For those within 
DfID, experimentation is indicative of ‘humility’ and ‘honesty’ and explicitly set up in contrast 
to an alternative ethos of “using the social power of the ‘expert’ to imply we know the answer 
when we actually have no solid evidential basis for our opinion or prejudice” (Whitty & Dercon, 
2013). Ruth Levine (2014) says that insisting upon evaluation is actually indicative of a rejection 
of ‘dogmatism’ by ‘saying we aren’t so sure about the effects of our actions, [and] we’re open to 
surprise and to learning’. In doing so, randomistas position a method and its corresponding ethos 
in contrast to approaches based on a priori policy prescriptions and immunize themselves from 
allegations of technocratic hubris (e.g., Eyben & Roche, 2013).  
This inquisitive modesty opens up new venues for their work and facilitates the 
expansion of the thought collective. For example, by positing that ‘it’s too soon to tell if 
behavioral economics can help a young woman in Uganda’, the Hewlett Foundation links 
promissory expectations with a commitment to disinterested evaluation (Choi, 2014). Here, as 
elsewhere, the attribution of ignorance or uncertainty serves to instantiate a “matter of concern” 
(Latour, 2004). As McGoey (2009) suggests, uncertainty ‘demands attention, debate, funding, 
and most crucially, experts to determine how the situation should be resolved... [T]he expert’s 
insistence on the uncertainty of a situation is virtually unchallengeable, for expert uncertainty, 
unlike expert knowledge, is difficult to dispute’. The randomistas strategically assign uncertainty 
and therefore bolster their rise (McGoey 2012).  
                                               
18 Consider a 2012 debate at NYU. Angus Deaton, an economist critical of RCTs and informed by the 
philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright, focused on the epistemological shortcomings of RCTs while 
Abhijit Banerjee instead detailed the new findings from recent RCTs, avoiding philosophical or 
methodological issues. See: http://www.nyudri.org/events/annual-conference-2012-debates-in-
development/deaton-v-banerjee/ 
19 Amongst others, Fourcade et al. (2015) have documented the ‘self-confidence’ of economists. As they 
note, ‘That confidence is perhaps the greatest achievement of the economics profession - but it is also its 
most vulnerable trait, its Achilles heel’. The randomistas, I would suggest, have a more complex 
performance, not least as a means to immunize themselves from critique. 
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But the randomistas do not remain in the domain of inquisitiveness alone. The applied 
nature of their research and the imperatives of policymaking encourage epistemic closure. This is 
in contrast to the role of experiments in other styles of economics. In her comparison of 
economic models and experiments, Mary Morgan (2005, p. 317) has argued that models may 
‘surprise’ economists but ‘experimental results may be unexplainable within existing theory and 
so ‘confound’ the experimenter’. Development RCTs have a different trajectory, rarely 
confounding but rather understood as ‘clinching’, to use Cartwright’s (2007) phrase. The 
randomistas also avoid another pitfall: critique that remains in the realm of empirical 
denunciations of prevailing consensus risks dissolving into a form of relativist nihilism 
(Boltanski, 2011). Had RCTs been used as ‘gotcha’ methods, always disproving, the randomistas 
might have been seen as mere denouncers. Yet, by offering policy prescriptions they have 
avoided such a possibility. There is thus a strategic, dialogic pivoting between iconoclasm and 
modesty, critique and confirmation. 
The methodology was also furthered through the adoption of a cautiously optimistic tone. 
Against ‘the rather melancholy view active in economics today’ (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, p. 
237), the randomistas offer hope. Duflo says this is ‘less depressing than the view that it is a big 
conspiracy against the poor. Name your favourite enemy- capitalism, corruption... Our view is 
easier. You think hard about the problems and you can solve them. That is why I feel generally a 
happy person, not at all discouraged’ (cited in Gapper, 2012). Such cautious optimism may seem 
to be an awkward bedfellow for their radical iconoclasm, but it is the multivocality of the 
randomistas which gives them their influence.  
To fellow economists, they debate econometric methods. To politicians, they offer low-
risk bang for your buck. To humanitarians of all stripes, they suggest progress is within reach. 
The discursive aspects discussed here - iconoclasm, modesty, inquisitiveness, optimism - are 
efforts to reconstitute the ethos of international aid. It is an approach often lauded by observers 
as surprising and sensible. BusinessWeek (2010) calls them ‘pragmatic rebels’. The Economist is 
a frequent exponent and popularizer, finding the approach ‘fascinating’ (2011a), ‘engrossing’ 
(2011b) and ‘more fruitful’ than ‘an animated fight over political profundities’ (2011c). A review 
of Poor economics is particularly illuminating for how influential media understand the thought 
collective. It is the ‘best [recent] book about the lives of the poor’ in large measure because they 
‘take the poorest billion people as they find them. There is no wishful thinking. The attitude is 
straightforward and honest, occasionally painfully so. And some of the conclusions are 
surprising, even disconcerting’ (The Economist, 2011d). 
It is in their most public engagements, however, that experimentation most emerges as a 
moral methodology. Many randomistas are motivated by a humanitarian ethos to end “distant 
suffering” (Boltanski, 1999). Duflo has said she felt ‘that what I should really do in my life is 
help the poor” (quoted in Parker, 2010) and when addressing large audiences she foregrounds 
what the historian Thomas Haskell (1985) called ‘humanitarian sensibility’.20 For example, her 
                                               
20 Parker (2010) describes Duflo’s motivation as ‘shaped by ‘Protestant left-wing Sunday school’ and by 
the international response to the Ethiopian famine of the mid-eighties (Band Aid, Live Aid). And it was 
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widely viewed TED Talk from 2010 opens by invoking the 200,000 deaths in the Haitian 
earthquake the month before. The presentation continues, juxtaposing stark imagery of poverty 
and disaster with schematic charts and statistics. She asserts that there is a ‘Haiti earthquake 
every eight days’ due to ‘entirely preventable causes’. The trouble is, aid in the moment is ‘not 
any better than the Medieval doctors and their leeches’. Duflo acknowledges that what 
Chouliaraki (2006) calls ‘the spectatorship of suffering’ is ‘a bit cheap’ but desirable for her 
purposes because ‘I’m already understated, and not very funny. I have to be a little in-your-face’ 
(Duflo, quoted in Parker, 2010). 
The randomistas, in these public appeals, argue for a merger of methodologies and 
orientations. From a genealogy of technocratic planning, they apply quantitative indicators, cost-
benefit analysis, and 
experimentation. From a genealogy 
of progressive politics, they seek 
human betterment, deploying an 
affective repertoire and creating 
“structures of feeling” (Williams, 
1977). Evidence Action, the NGO 
created by the randomistas and 
discussed below, is a prime example 
of this. Its staff explain that they 
“are driven by passion” but seek to 
avoid being blinded by it: “we need 
to divorce ourselves from the 
products we are so passionate about, 
and focus on an empirical 
assessment of what the problem is 
we are trying to solve” (Evidence 
Action, 2014). This self-discipline 
and hybridity brings forth its own 
representational styles, forms, and 
content. The Evidence Action website (pictured), for example, displays the visual techniques of 
distant moral sentiments (anonymous African and South Asian children, in particular) with those 
of experimental rigor (charts and graphs that simplify and condense statistical and experimental 
analyses). It equally includes academic papers, policy briefs, and ‘colorful’ launch events with 
magicians, folks dances, and Sanskrit verses being chanted (Ramachandran, 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                       
shaped, too, by the work done by her mother, a doctor, who, from the late seventies onward, left her 
pediatric practice in Paris for a few weeks each year to treat child victims of war, first in Western Sahara 
and later in El Salvador and Rwanda. Duflo described her mother as ‘a generous human being to the point 
where it’s unnerving for the rest of us’. 
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Attention to the representations of the randomistas reveals that far from being constrained 
within a methodological straightjacket - as some critics have alleged - the thought collective 
actually displays a great variety of legitimating strategies. The variety of approaches - from the 
emotive to the scientific - are not understood by the proponents nor their audience as 
inconsistent; instead, the randomistas have grown by weaving together different registers of 
value and rationality (cf. Weber, 1978, pp. 24-26). If these strategies have successfully translated 
ideas about the virtue of certainty into institutional practice, they have not eliminated 
indeterminacy. Instead, they have fueled an expansion of the “search for the unequivocal” 
(Breslau, 1998) – a dynamic to which the final section of this article turns.  
 
After experimentation: The persistence of uncertainty 
In January 2015, the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, a leading source of 
experimental economics, published six RCTs in a single issue. Each experiment analysed the 
impact of microcredit, in settings from Morocco to Mongolia. Arguing that prior evidence from 
microcredit’s proponents ‘failed to disentangle causation from correlation’, Banerjee and his 
colleagues concluded that microcredit was not capable of ‘transformative effects’. At best, these 
experiments proved it was ‘modestly positive’ with regard to indicators of health, education, 
women’s empowerment, or other topics, though some of the experiments found no significant 
changes. For some observers, the issue suggested ‘the final word on microcredit’ (Sandefur, 
2015), but for others, knowledge was not certain, and “there are still many questions to be 
answered” (Ogden, 2015). If microcredit is any indicator, the capacity of RCTs to resolve 
indeterminacy about the effectiveness of aid was less than promised. Indeed, the rise of the 
randomistas has heralded less a closure of questions than a redistribution of the ways of 
answering them.21 As this final section shows, while the randomistas successfully questioned 
prevailing assumptions about how to assess aid, in more recent years, RCTs themselves have 
become the subject of uncertainty.  
Ongoing concerns about the reliability of evaluative knowledge has led to a twofold 
transition. On the one hand, the “experimental system” (Rheinberger, 2010) has been expanded 
to include three new methods: experimental replication, trial registries, and systematic reviews. 
On the other hand, the randomista thought collective has grown to include aid organizations 
directly implementing projects based on experimental results. Both expansions follow from the 
normative presuppositions of the thought collective. The former seeks to reinforce the epistemic 
virtues of experimentation, minimizing uncertainty due to subjective bias or particular contexts. 
The latter is an effort to reduce human suffering by acting upon knowledge considered 
unequivocal and bypass the politicized delays of governments and aid institutions. That is, the 
                                               
21 The question of ‘how experiments end’ (Galison, 1987) is foundational to science studies. In Collins’s 
(1985) influential explanation, scientific tests cannot prove conclusive without a broader set of social 
institutions and forms of life. Any given experimentation or replication is subject to a potentially infinite 
regress: ‘since experiment is a matter of skillful practice, it can never be clear whether a second 
experiment has been done sufficiently well to count as a check on the results of a first. Some further test 
is needed to test the quality of the experiment - and so forth’ (Collins, 1985, p. 2). 
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former are recognizably still driven by efforts at epistemic closure within the bounds of 
evidentiary tests while the latter reflect a more localized consensus about ‘what works’ and a 
moral urgency to act.  
 The extension of the thought collective demonstrates the heightened influence of its 
styles of reasoning, its techniques, and its practices within the international aid community. 
Experimentality - Petryna’s (2009) term for the expansion of experimental rationalities of 
governing - simultaneously redistributes the dominant ways of assigning worth within aid and 
who is capable of doing so. Some critics of the randomistas have emphasized a different ethos 
for aid work. Kaushik Basu (2014) insists that ‘we have to rely on intuition, common sense and 
judgment’, while Lant Pritchett (2014a) says ‘there is no shortcut around using judgment and 
wisdom’. Yet. no thought collective has emerged to promote wisdom, judgment, intuition, and 
common sense in aid; instead, randomistas can adopt such diffuse concepts as complementary to 
their existing practices (see Glennerster 2014; Blattman 2014). The inverse - insisting upon 
RCTs - cannot so easily be incorporated without expanding the thought collective’s influence 
and authority. In the discussion that follows, I document how a continued insistence on 
uncertainty has expanded aid’s experimentality.  
 
Extending the experimental system: Replication, registries, and reviews 
The most enduring critique of aid experimentation is the issue of ‘external validity’. Because the 
precision of an experiment comes at the cost of a narrow scope, the cost of an internally valid 
study is relative ignorance about its applicability elsewhere (Cartwright, 2007). The limitations 
are most often considered spatially (e.g., experimental evidence from Western Kenya may not 
illuminate a southern Indian case – or even elsewhere in Kenya). But there is also temporal 
particularity: RCTs are a form of historical documentation, telling you what resulted in one case. 
They do not offer sturdy grounds for projection into the future (Pritchett, 2014b). 
         Members of the thought collective acknowledge these limitations in technical fora but 
less commonly raise them when speaking to other publics. Indeed, the limitations of external 
validity sit uneasily with the desire for policy relevance. The slippage from here to there and 
from ex post evaluation to ex ante justification is implicit in the effort to produce useful social 
science – and critics have often asserted that the results of RCTs are not therefore unequivocal. 
         In response, proponents have sought to cultivate a version of ‘controlled 
decontextualization’ (Cooper & Waldby, 2014, p. 11). Through methodological, institutional, 
and discursive means they have sought to improve the generalizability of their findings. A key 
means of doing so is through experimental replication. For example, Innovations for Poverty 
Action experimentally evaluated the Ultra Poor Graduation program in six countries on more 
than 10,000 subjects, leading them to conclude that ‘a multifaceted approach to increasing 
income and well-being for the ultrapoor is sustainable and cost-effective’ (Banerjee et al., 
2015).22 The congruence of results in contexts as varied as Honduras and Ethiopia is interpreted 
as a strong basis on which to endorse the intervention. 
                                               
22 Other examples of replication are discussed in Browne et al. (2014, p. 228). 
 20 
Such significant research efforts respond to concerns that ‘the dappled world’, to use 
Cartwright’s (1999) felicitous phrase, is a source of uncertainty within international 
development.  But efforts such as these are expensive and unwieldy, unlikely to become the 
norm. Randomistas are doubtful of the possibility to replicate one-off experiments in another 
location (so-called ‘external replication’) (Levitt & List, 2009, p. 14). Advocates of 
experimentation want funding bodies to encourage ‘replication in multiple settings and thus 
external validity on assessments of promising interventions’ (Birdsall & Perakis, 2011), yet this 
may not be feasible. 
In contrast, ‘internal replications’ may be less costly, risky, and difficult. In these, the 
models and calculations of published studies are replicated. Proponents realize that existing 
disciplinary practices and incentives militate against internal replication and that prior efforts to 
do so have failed (Hamermesh, 2007, p. 723); however, they argue that it is important because it 
not only corrects errant results (McCullough & McKitrick, 2009), but also ‘provides incentives 
for the experimenter to collect data carefully’ (Levitt & List, 2009, p. 14).23 Replication, 
therefore, is envisioned as a means of reaffirming the epistemic virtues of experimentation, and 
organizations like 3ie have recently begun funding, guiding, and conducting international 
replications. 
As a technique to discipline scientific selves, calls for replication are being joined by 
efforts to create experimental trial registries in development economics. Trial registries permit 
randomistas to submit their plans for research and analysis prior to conducting the work. This 
similarly responds to suggestions of impropriety that make experimental results less trustworthy. 
For one, the competitive pressures of academic research encourage biases in what is published. 
The dissemination of null results is infrequent despite the regular airing of concerns and 
suggestions for reforms – including one for a Journal of Failed Experiments from the World 
Bank’s Chief Economist (Basu, 2014). Moreover, there is a concern that researchers are 
‘fishing’, or adapting their “models and specifications in order to yield statistically significant 
results” (Brown, Cameron, and Wood, 2014). Such critics are attuned to the social dynamics of 
research and seek institutional and methodological means to transform them, shoring up the trust 
in experimentality. 
         For her part, Esther Duflo believes that ‘The FDA requires reporting results of any 
funded medical trial. Institutions of this type need to be developed for field experiments’. The 
thought collective’s methodological handbook asserts that ‘there is virtually no downside to 
registering that we are undertaking an evaluation, and there is an important public benefit, so this 
form of registration is strongly encouraged’ (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013, p. 375). In 2013, 
the American Economic Association launched a registry for social science experiments, and 3ie 
developed a related initiative to catalogue impact evaluations of international aid projects. 
         The standardization of experimental knowledge permits the commensuration and, 
therefore, comparability of results. Similarly, the growth of “systematic reviews” in international 
                                               
23 Deaton (2010, p. 424) documents the methodological difficulties of experimentation that he believes 
‘undermine any claims to statistical or epistemic superiority'. 
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development is a means to gather disparate studies into an authoritative assessment of particular 
interventions.24 Organizations like the World Bank, 3ie, and J-PAL create systematic reviews in 
order to use multiple sources to minimize the uncertainty associated with any individual 
researcher or location.25 In the words of 3ie proponents, systematic reviews differ from 
conventional literature reviews because they have ‘a clear protocol for systematically searching 
defined databases over a defined time period, with transparent criteria for the inclusion or 
exclusion of studies, as well as the analysis and reporting of study findings’ (Waddington et al., 
2012, p. 360). Thus, as with other aspects of the experimental system, systematic reviews are 
appealing because their procedural objectivity is said to remove subjective bias and errant 
results.  
 
 
From evidence to implementation 
If replication, registries, and reviews have sought to enhance the epistemic virtues for which 
RCTs were promoted, in more recent years the randomista thought collective has expanded one 
layer further. Although the thought collective has always been concerned with applied research 
and useful science, it is important to emphasize that core members are today engaged directly in 
the implementation of aid projects. The most notable example of this is Evidence Action, an 
NGO established in 2013 and initially ‘incubated’ by Innovations for Poverty Action, the Yale-
based hub for experimental evaluations of aid. Evidence Action focuses on ‘scaling’ 
‘interventions whose efficacy is backed by substantial rigorous evidence’ (Waddington & Leach, 
2014). They seek to provide ‘cost-effective impact for many’. The impetus for such a shift is the 
acknowledgment that ‘There is a gap between what research shows is effective in development 
and what happens in practice’. Evidence Action’s first initiative was to absorb Deworm the 
World, a children’s health initiative created by Michael Kremer. Today it also distributes 
chlorinated water dispensers in areas without reliable infrastructure, often partnering with 
governments in places like India, Kenya, and Ethiopia. In both cases, Evidence Action bases its 
work on experimental evaluations of these programs, including Kremer’s early evaluation of 
deworming and subsequent work by J-PAL and IPA on clean water dispensers. It aims to ‘bridge 
the gap between rigorous research and pilot programs on the one hand, and institutionalized 
programs on the other’.26 
 If the randomista thought collective is visualized as a Matryoshka doll with J-PAL at the 
center, Evidence Action is perhaps the outermost nesting doll. Its recent formation represents the 
growth of the thought collective from a few economists engaged in academic research, to 
organizations suited for coordinating and translating such research, to now the actual aid 
organizations themselves. Earlier work sought to convince and enroll allies into the randomista 
                                               
24 Systematic reviews are most commonly associated with the biomedical work of the Cochrane initiative, 
which randomistas invoke as a model.   
25 Moreira (2007) discusses systematic reviews in medicine as a process of ‘disentanglement’ and 
‘qualification’ of results. 
26 See: http://www.evidenceaction.org/who-we-are/#vision-values 
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worldview, but Evidence Action acts on behalf of a consensus within the thought collective 
about ‘what works’. As a semi-autonomous entity, it can move forward with its work rather than 
needing to enroll many others for each action. This status was made clear in a recent dispute (the 
so-called ‘worm wars’) where the study offered by Evidence Action to support deworming was 
questioned by a replication (Davey et al., 2015). While a full analysis of the dispute is beyond 
the scope of this paper (but see Evans, 2015), what matters to emphasize is both the ongoing 
debates about the credibility of development knowledge and the way in which Evidence Action 
was able to continue its work despite the uncertainty. It is, then, an institutionalization of the 
randomistas’ rise. 
 
Conclusion  
Published in 1986, An anthropological critique of development long preceded the profusion of 
evidence-based policy and the randomistas. Yet in that volume - subtitled ‘the growth of 
ignorance’ - Mark Hobart (1986, p. 4) noted that ‘claims to knowledge and the attribution of 
ignorance are central themes to development and remain seriously under-studied’. In the 
intervening years, more attention has been turned to the politics of knowledge within 
development, yet Hobart’s insight about the importance of claims to knowledge or ignorance 
remains pointed. The rise of the randomistas represents perhaps the apogee of ‘the attribution of 
ignorance’. In the past 15 years, the nature of knowing and the state of knowledge have become 
matters of concern within an aid industry transformed by demands for accountability, the 
influence of economists, and the proliferation of NGOs. Adeptly legitimated by proponents, 
RCTs have filled this void but, as scholars of experimentation in medicine have documented, 
RCTs are incapable of securing certainty. Indeed, as McGoey (2010, p. 71) argues, it ‘is the very 
methodological weaknesses of RCTs that imbues them with the authority they hold: for to deny 
the reliability of a particular study, one must reach for more data, more studies, larger RCTs, in 
order to justify the validity of one’s objections’. In the case of the aid randomistas, it is a tacking 
back and forth – between promises of certainty and accusations of uncertainty; between registers 
of argumentation; and between audiences – that has helped reconstitute the spirit of international 
aid.  Their repertoires of justification have certainly included their own uncertainties and 
evasions, but the history demonstrates they have successfully attributed uncertainty elsewhere. 
Furthermore – in a logic recalling Power’s (1997) theorization of the audit society – this lack of 
certitude has not called into question certainty writ large but served to justify further 
experimentation.  
 Attention to the dynamics of critique in international aid reveals in part how institutions 
like the World Bank and disciplines like economics achieve their enduring influence. While 
some criticisms remain unheard within the halls of the World Bank (or at the very least 
unengaged), in other ways, aid organizations are highly responsive to critique. In the case of the 
randomistas, this was facilitated due to the conditions of possibility and their legitimating 
strategies. But this incorporation of critique also functions to displace more radical voices, a 
dynamic that Boltanski (2011) suggests is crucial to the dominance of institutions whose 
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reflexivity can immunize them by reappropriating and modifying critique. As James Ferguson 
(2014) wryly notes, ‘The World Bank has always been a very articulate critic of positions that it 
held ten years earlier’. In part, the rise of the randomistas suggests, this is due to the moral 
orientations and grammars which permeate its regimes of justification. Such an approach differs 
from those who view technocracy as powerful due to its popular inaccessibility or its 
depoliticization by elites; such an understanding – for which Habermas’s (1985) concern for the 
colonization of the lifeworld by instrumental rationality and market forces is a touchstone – can 
only tell at most half the story. They too often miss the affective and ethical appeals immanent 
within technical domains. The randomistas show how the translation of an ethos into a thought 
collective can reorient methodology and practice—and with it the distribution of authority and 
resources. These changes deserve criticism of their own, but in addition to marshalling a critique, 
this paper has suggested we need a better understanding of the social, moral, and epistemological 
dynamics at play, without which, the criticism is likely to miss its mark. 
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